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Marking a Road to Nowhere? Supreme Court Sets Punitive
Damages Guideposts in BMW v. Gore
One might think that the debate over punitive damages, which
has a history dating back thousands of years,' would have been set-
tled long ago. Nothing could be further from the truth. Though
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the debate steadily
smoldered and at times flared up,2 it has been positively raging during
the past several decades This increased attention to punitive dam-
ages appears to have been ignited by unprecedented monetary
1. See, e.g., Exodus 22:4 (requiring double restitution for the crime of theft); 1
LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 1-3 (3d ed. 1995)
(noting the existence of punitive damages in the Code of Hammurabi in 2000 B.C., in
Hittite Law in 1400 B.C., in ancient Greek and Roman law, and in England since the thir-
teenth century); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (1982) (discussing the origins of punitive damages
in the Anglo-American law); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Historical Continuity of
Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1284-
1304 (1993) (tracing the evolution of punitive damages from the ancient to the English
and American judicial systems). On punitive damages generally, see GERALD W.
BOSTON, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN TORT LAW (1993); JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J.
KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE (1996); SCHLUETER & REDDEN,
supra; David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform,
39 VILL. L. REV. 363 (1994).
2. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 1, at 1298-1301 (describing the sometimes emo-
tionally charged eighteenth century debates between Simon Greenleaf of Harvard Law
School, who argued that punitive damages were without doctrinal basis in Anglo-
American law, and Thomas Sedgwick, a practitioner and commentator, who advocated
punitive damages on their practical usefulness and historical acceptance). Compare Fay
v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1872) ("[T]his heresy [punitive damages] should be taken in
hand without favor, firmly and fearlessly.... [N]ot reluctantly should we apply the knife
to this deformity, concerning which every true member of the sound and healthy body of
the law may well exclaim,--'I have no need of thee.' "), with Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 17,
20 (Wis. 1914) ("The law giving exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the English love
of liberty regulated by law. It tends to elevate the jury as a responsible instrument of
government .... restrains the strong, influential and unscrupulous, vindicates the right of
the weak, and encourages recourse to, and confidence in, the courts of law .... ).
3. There have been three law review symposia dedicated to punitive damages in
recent years. See Symposium, Punitive Damages Awards in Products Liability Litigation:
Strong Medicine or Poison Pill?, 39 VILL. L. REV. 353 (1994); Symposium, Punitive Dam-
ages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 687 (1989); Symposium, Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1982). In addition to the symposia, see George C. Christie, Current Trends in the Ameri-
can Law of Punitive Damages, 20 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 349 (1991); William H. Volz &
Michael C. Fayz, Punitive Damages and the Due Process Clause: The Search for Constitu-
tional Standards, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 459 (1992); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The
Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269
(1983).
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damage awards,' which by the late 1980s resulted in a perception
among legal scholars and the public alike that punitive damages were
"out of control."5
Punitive damages, as the name suggests, are penal rather than
compensatory in nature and introduce a quasi-criminal element into
civil law proceedings.' The most frequently cited purposes for puni-
tive damages are twofold: (1) to punish the wrongdoer for his actions
and (2) to deter such conduct by others in the future.' Without the
4. See, e.g., BE & K Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America,
AFL-CIO, 90 F.3d 1318, 1321, 1331-32 (8th Cir. 1996) (partially reversing verdict and
ordering retrial because of introduction of prejudicial evidence where jury had returned
verdict including $20 million in punitive damages); O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc.,
821 F.2d 1438, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1987) (upholding jury verdict of $10 million of punitive
damages to single plaintiff); Central Telecomm., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d
711, 732 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding $25 million verdict of punitive damages); Continental
Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 1520, 1528-37 (W.D. Okla. 1992)
(denying motion for remittitur and upholding jury award of $30 million in punitive dam-
ages as reasonable); Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225, 1238 (S.D. Iowa 1991)
(remitting $50 million punitive damages award to $28 million); Amoco Chem. Co. v. Cer-
tain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, No. B083904, 1996 WL 407855, at *1 (Cal. App.
June 4, 1996) (reversing judgment and ordering retrial where improperly instructed jury
awarded $386 million in punitive damages); Sprague v. Walter, 656 A.2d 890, 930 (Pa.
Super. 1995) (remitting $31.5 million punitive damages award for libel to $21.5 million);
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (reducing $3 bil-
lion punitive damages assessment to $1 billion).
5. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139, 139 (1986) ("In my view, punitive damages are out of con-
trol."); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has
Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117, 1154 (1984) ("[Tlhe amount of punitive
damages awarded in recent years, as if feeding upon itself, has escalated to astronomical
figures that boggle the mind."); Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common
Law Development of the Use of Punitive Damages in Modern Product Liability Litigation,
40 ALA. L. REV. 919, 919 (1989) (noting that prior to 1976, only three reported appellate
product liability decisions upheld punitive damages awards, none of which exceeded
$250,000, while "[t]oday, hardly a month goes by without a multimillion-dollar punitive
damages verdict in products liability case." (citations omitted)). But see Stephen Daniels
& Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1, 35-62
(1990) (presenting empirical evidence undermining critics' claims about the incidence,
size, and effects of punitive damages); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in
Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOvA L. REv. 1, 23
(1989) ("Every empirical study of punitive damages awards concludes that there is simply
no evidence that punitive damages are routinely awarded."); id. at 87 (reviewing studies
and concluding that "punitive damages are being appropriately applied."); Rustad &
Koenig, supra note 1, at 1307 (stating that empirical evidence shows that "punitive dam-
ages are neither routine nor staggering").
6. See Owen, supra note 1, at 365.
7. See id.; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("[Punitive
damages] are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to
deter its future occurrence."); 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, at 21 ("[T]he most
widely accepted purposes [of punitive damages] have been punishment and deterrence.");
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procedural safeguards provided by the criminal system, the standards
applicable to punitive damages have been unclear.8 Consequently,
defendants assessed with such penalties recently have challenged pu-
nitive damages on various constitutional grounds.9
It was just such a challenge, brought under the umbrella of due
process, that gave rise to the recent case BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore." In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court for the first
time in history reversed a punitive damages award from a state
court." The Court determined that a two million dollar punitive
damages award assessed against BMW for not disclosing it had re-
painted the plaintiff's car prior to sale violated the Constitution."
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 1, at 1309-26 (discussing the contemporary functions of
punitive damages and noting that the punishment and deterrent functions are the most
frequently cited rationales for punitive damages). Additional purposes for punitive dam-
ages include assisting the plaintiff in recovering litigation expenses and providing an
incentive for a person who has incurred only minimal injuries to bring suit. See 1
SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, at 33-36.
8. See Owen, supra note 1, at 365 (pointing out that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
burden of proof and prohibitions against double jeopardy, excessive fines, and compul-
sory self-incrimination do not apply in the civil arena of punitive damages); id. at 384-88
(accepting as well-founded the criticism that the standards for awarding punitive dam-
ages, such as "malice," "fraud," or "oppression," as well as the standards for setting the
amount of punitive damages, are vague and lead to unprincipled and excessive awards).
This lack of clarity in the standards applicable to punitive damages is witnessed by the
cases reviewed in this Note, which challenge punitive damages on both procedural and
substantive due process grounds. See infra notes 82-145 and accompanying text.
9. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,418 (1994) (procedural due process
challenge); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993)
(procedural and substantive due process challenge); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 7 (1990) (procedural due process challenge); Browning-Ferris Ind. of Vermont
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260, 276-77 (1989) (excessive fines and due process
challenge); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76-80 (1988) (due process
challenge); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986) (excessive fines and
due process challenges); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349 (limiting availability of punitive
damages in defamation suits because of competing interests of First Amendment free-
doms); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 975, 988-1007 (1989) (arguing that a higher evidentiary standard, the bifurcation of
the liability and damages phases of trial, and the determination of the punitive damages
by the judge are necessary to accord defendants procedural due process); Volz & Fayz,
supra note 3, at 462-81 (reviewing the Supreme Court's recent decisions concerning the
constitutionality of punitive damages); Wheeler, supra note 3, at 272 (arguing for in-
creased procedural safeguards to bring punitive damages into compliance with due
process and for the application of the criminal safeguards of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments to punitive damages actions).
10. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
11. See id. at 1604 (stating that the punitive damages award violates the Constitu-
tion); id. at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's decision is "the first
instance of this Court's invalidation of a state-court punitive assessment as simply unrea-
sonably large").
12. See infra text accompanying note 55 (discussing the Supreme Court's holding that
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This Note first reviews the majority," concurring," and dissent-
ing'5 opinions in BMW. The Note then traces the Supreme Court's
inclusion of punitive damages in its due process jurisprudence," a
move which left as many questions as answers. Next, BMW is ana-
lyzed in terms of its attempt to reconcile competing viewpoints from
previous decisions and set forth a substantive due process standard
for punitive damages, an attempt which this Note argues was not en-
tirely successful. Finally, this Note concludes that while the
Supreme Court's reversal of a state-court punitive damages award is
significant in itself, the unavoidable subjectivity that pervades nearly
all aspects of the Court's decision suggests that a definitive answer to
the punitive damages debate, if one exists, may lie elsewhere.
In January 1990, Dr. Ira Gore, Jr. purchased what he thought
was a new BMW sports sedan. Approximately nine months later, he
took the car to a detailer who told him it had been repainted. 9 Dr.
Gore sued BMW of North America (BMW), alleging that BMW's
failure to disclose the car's repainting was the "suppression of a ma-
terial fact," constituting fraud in Alabama.2' In not disclosing it had
repainted the car, BMW acted in accordance with its nationwide pol-
icy, adopted in 1983, pertaining to the damage of cars in manufacture
or transit." This policy provided that BMW could sell as new a car
that had been damaged and subsequently repaired, so long as the re-
pair cost did not exceed three percent of the car's retail price; such
repairs were not disclosed to the dealer.' Because the cost of re-
the punitive damages award in BMW was unconstitutional).
13. See infra notes 33-55 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 82-145 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 146-86 and accompanying text.
18. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593. Dr. Gore purchased the automobile from an
authorized BMW dealer in Birmingham, Alabama. See id.
19. See id. Dr. Gore did not notice any imperfections in the car's appearance prior to
taking it to the detailer. See id He took his BMW to a local detailer, Slick Finish, to
make it "look 'snazzier than it normally would appear.'" Id. (citation omitted).
20. See id at 1593 n.3. Fraud is defined by statute in Alabama: "Suppression of a
material fact which the party is under an obligation to communicate constitutes fraud.
The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties or
from the particular circumstances of the case." ALA. CODE § 6-5-102 (1993).
21. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593. There was no Alabama law on nondisclosure when
BMW enacted this policy, and, indeed, Alabama did not pass such a law until after this
trial. See ALA. CODE § 8-19-5(22)(c) (1993) (requiring disclosure only if the repair cost
exceeds the greater of five hundred dollars or three percent of the value of the car). Had
the statute been in effect when Dr. Gore purchased his car, presumably BMW's nondis-
closure would have been lawful.
22. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593. If the repair cost exceeded three percent of the
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painting Dr. Gore's car was less than three percent of its value, the
Birmingham dealer was not told that BMW had repainted the car.
At trial,24 the jury awarded Dr. Gore four thousand dollars in
compensatory damages and four million dollars in punitive dam-
ages.' After an unsuccessful post-trial motion to set aside the
punitive damages award, BMW appealed to the Alabama Supreme
Court.2 The court reviewed the jury award in light of the factors that
it previously had articulated in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby,' which had
car's retail price, the car would be placed into company service to be sold as used at a
later date. See id.
23. See id. Dr. Gore paid $40,750.88 for his BMW. See id. The $601.37 cost of re-
painting the car was 1.5% of that value. See id.
24. Dr. Gore did not attempt to settle the dispute before resorting to litigation. See
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 624 (Ala. 1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct.
1589 (1996).
25. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1593-94. At trial, the former owner of the dealership that
sold the car to Dr. Gore testified that Dr. Gore's car was worth approximately ten percent
less than a BMW that had not been repainted. See id. at 1593. In addition, the plaintiff's
attorney introduced evidence of 983 refinished cars, each with a repair cost exceeding
$300, sold as new by BMW since 1983. See id. Accordingly, he urged the jury to return a
verdict of $4 million to account for the profits BMW had wrongfully taken from people
acting under this policy. See id. Under Alabama law, in order for the jury to award puni-
tive damages, it must have found that the defendant's behavior constituted "gross,
oppressive or malicious" fraud. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-11-20, 6-11-21 (1993).
26. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1594. BMW based its nondisclosure policy on the strictest
state statute regarding nondisclosure on record in 1983. See id. at 1600. Because its ac-
tion in this case was consistent with all of the approximately twenty-five states that had
statutes on such nondisclosure, BMW argued that its lawful conduct in those states could
not be used in calculating punitive damages. See id. at 1594. In addition, BMW empha-
sized the disparity between the instant action and Yates v. BMW of North America, Inc.,
642 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1993), a case in which the plaintiff on remarkably similar facts was
denied punitive damages. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1594 n.8.
Justice Houston of the Alabama Supreme Court described this disparity as follows:
The Yates case and this case are almost identical. The same excellent lawyers
represented Yates that represent Gore; the same excellent lawyers represented
BMW NA in both cases. Excellent trial judges, in the same judicial circuit, con-
ducted as nearly perfect trials as can be conducted. Each plaintiff was a member
of a respected profession; each was a physician. BMW NA was the defendant in
each case. How does Gore get $2,000,000 in punitive damages and Yates get
nothing in punitive damages? Different juries.
BMW, 646 So. 2d at 630-31 (Ala. 1994) (Houston, J., concurring).
27. 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989). These factors include (1) a reasonable relationship
between the punitive damages and the harm caused or likely to occur from the defen-
dant's conduct; (2) the" 'degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct' "; (3) the
removal of any profit from the defendant attributable to the wrongful conduct, plus some
amount in excess of the profit; (4) the " 'financial position of the defendant' "; (5) " '[a]ll
the costs of litigation.., so as to encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to trial' "; (6)
mitigation for criminal sanctions imposed on the defendant for this conduct; (7) mitiga-
tion for civil actions against the defendant for this conduct. See id. at 223-24 (quoting
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. LaJoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1062 (Ala. 1987) (Houston, J., concur-
ring)).
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been expressly approved by the United States Supreme Court.2s The
Alabama Supreme Court found BMW's conduct "reprehensible" and
partially upheld the verdict.29 The court held that the jury had im-
properly relied on actions in other jurisdictions as a multiplier in
computing the verdict and ordered a remittitur for two million dollars
in punitive damages? In setting this amount, the Alabama court
stated it was "not consider[ing] those acts that occurred in other ju-
risdictions" and held the two million dollar remittitur
"constitutionally reasonable."31 BM1W appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, claiming the remitted punitive damages award vio-
lated its due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, first stated the constitu-
tional limitation underlying the case: "The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a
' "grossly excessive"' punishment on a tortfeasor." 32 After reviewing
the facts, Justice Stevens began his analysis by considering the states'
legitimate interests in punitive damages, punishment and deterrence,
and the effect of punitive damages on interstate commerce and state
sovereignty.33 He observed that while every state has an interest in
protecting its citizens from deceptive trade practices, no single state
may impose its policies on other states.' Accordingly, Alabama's
penalties against BMW must be commensurate with its own interests
28. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991); see also infra
notes 93-108 and accompanying text (discussing Haslip).
29. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1594-95.
30. See id. at 1595.
31. BMW, 646 So. 2d 619, 628-29 (Ala. 1994). The United States Supreme Court
observed that while the Alabama court claimed it engaged in a "comparative analysis"
that considered Alabama and cases in other jurisdictions with similar facts, it cited no
such cases. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595 & n.11. Justice Houston of the Alabama Su-
preme Court, in his special concurrence, noted that "punitive damages awards in the
Alabama cases involving fraud in the sale of automobiles range from a low of $11,800 to a
high of $162,637" and that the range in other jurisdictions was "similar to, although
slightly wider than, the range in Alabama." BMW, 646 So. 2d at 629 (Houston, J., concur-
ring). Whether the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that $2 million is comparable to
$162,637 is unclear.
32. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1592 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993)). The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ....." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595-98; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text
(discussing the purposes of punitive damages).
34. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1596-97 (citing Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592,594
(1881) ("No State can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction.")). Such an
imposition would infringe not only upon the rights of sister states, but also on the federal
government's power to regulate interstate commerce. See iL at 1597.
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and not punish or deter conduct lawful elsewhere. 5 When Alabama's
interests are thus limited, the Court concluded, it becomes "apparent
... that this award is grossly excessive. '
Next, Justice Stevens moved to a due process analysis and de-
clared that "[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice
not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment but also
of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose."37 In deter-
mining that such notice had not been given and thus, that the award
was grossly excessive, the Court set forth and analyzed three
"guideposts": (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct; (2) the ratio between the actual or potential harm and the
punitive damages award; and (3) sanctions for similar misconduct.
The Court considered the degree of reprehensibility of the de-
fendant's conduct, with its long historical pedigree, as "[p]erhaps the
most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award."39 Discussing reprehensible conduct from previous cases, the
Court highlighted such factors as the presence of violence, trickery
and deceit, malice, reckless disregard of others' safety, deliberate
false statements, concealment of improper motive, and repeated en-
gagement in conduct known to be prohibited.4 The Court found that
such aggravating factors not only were absent from BMW's conduct,41
but also that BMW, relying on the law of other jurisdictions, pos-
sessed a "good-faith basis" to believe it had no duty to disclose in this
case.
42
The Court next considered its second guidepost: the ratio be-
tween actual and potential harm to the plaintiff and the punitive
damages award.43 As with the degree of reprehensibility, the Court
pointed out the historical acceptance of "[t]he principle that
[punitive] damages must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to compen-
35. See id. at 1597-98.
36. Id. at 1598.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 1598-99.
39. Id. at 1599 (citing Day v. Woodworth, 55 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (stating
that exemplary damages should reflect "the enormity of the offense")).
40. See id at 1599-1601.
41. See Ud at 1599.
42. See id. at 1600, 1601 ("We may simply emphasize that the record contains no
evidence that BMW's decision to follow a disclosure policy that coincided with the strict-
est extant state statute was sufficiently reprehensible to justify a $2 million award of
punitive damages.").
43. See id. at 1601-03.
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satory damages."" Rather than relying on historical standards, how-
ever, the Court emphasized its recent decisions of Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip45 and TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Re-
sources Corp.,' where it found ratios of four to one and ten to one
"'close to the line... of constitutional impropriety.' ,4 The Court
then noted that Dr. Gore's two million dollar award, five hundred
times his actual harm, was "dramatically greater" than the awards
upheld in Haslip and TXO.' As it had done in the previous cases,
the Court unequivocally rejected the existence of a simple mathe-
matical formula: "' "We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. We can say,
however, that [a] general concer[n] of reasonableness ... properly
enter[s], into the constitutional calculus." ' ..
The third guidepost used by the Court to determine excessive-
ness was the comparison of the punitive damages award with the civil
and criminal penalties for similar misconduct!' A survey of state
statutes on deceptive trade practices revealed no fine greater than ten
thousand dollars; in addition, there had been no judicial decision to
put BMW on notice that such a severe fine could be imposed for its
policy.5' The Court concluded that "[i]n the absence of a history of
44. Ii. at 1601.
45. 499 U.S. 1 (1991); see also infra notes 93-108 and accompanying text (discussing
Haslip).
46. 509 U.S. 443 (1993); see also infra notes 109-31 and accompanying text (discussing
TXO).
47. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24). In TXO, the Court
considered the amount of harm which potentially would have been inflicted on the plain-
tiff had the defendant succeeded in its tortious scheme determinative in finding the
punitive damages award constitutionally acceptable. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 460-61. When
this potential harm was taken into account, a ratio which otherwise would have been 526
to 1 became 10 to 1. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602; see also infra notes 118-19 and accom-
panying text (discussing this potential harm factor).
48. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602. The Court noted that neither Dr. Gore, nor any
other BMW customer, would be subject to additional potential harm from BMW's non-
disclosure policy. See id. The Court went on to call this five hundred to one ratio a
"breathtaking [one that] must surely 'raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.'" Id. at 1603
(quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 482 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
49. Id, at 1602 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 458 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18)).
50. See id. at 1603.
51. See id. The applicable statute in Alabama, the Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
authorized a maximum civil penalty of two thousand dollars for BMW's conduct. See
ALA. CODE § 8-19-11(b) (1993); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-112-309(b) (Michie 1992)
(authorizing five thousand dollar and ten thousand dollar fines for violation of the state's
Motor Vehicle Commission Act); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.27(12) (West Supp. 1997)
(authorizing up to a one thousand dollar fine); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-5(g) (1994)
1997] 1091
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
noncompliance with known statutory requirements, there is no basis
for assuming that a more modest sanction would not have been suffi-
cient to motivate full compliance with the disclosure requirement
imposed by the Alabama Supreme Court in this case."52
Justice Stevens summarized the majority opinion by highlighting
the competing interests at issue: Alabama's interest in protecting its
citizens from deceptive trade practices, BMW's entitlement to fair
notice of the consequences of its actions, and the limitations on each
state from imposing its regulatory policies on its neighbors and un-
duly burdening interstate commerce.' Finally, he stated, "We are
fully convinced that the grossly excessive award imposed in this case
transcends the constitutional limit."'
Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurrence to explain why the
"strong presumption of validity" generally accorded a judgment re-
sulting from fair procedures was overcome in Dr. Gore's case.'5
Justice Breyer expressed a concern that law and legal processes,
rather than "arbitrary coercion" or the "decisionmaker's caprice,"
govern our legal system. 6 Indeed, such "application of law.., helps
to assure the uniform general treatment of similarly situated persons
that is the essence of law itself."'
Justice Breyer discussed five areas in which Alabama's legal
process failed to provide the necessary constraint on the jury and the
courts. 5 First, he observed that the applicable Alabama statute gave
no guidance regarding the size of a punitive damages award appro-
(authorizing an administrator to assess a maximum penalty of two thousand dollars); iL
§ 10-1-397(a) (Supp. 1996) (authorizing a superior court to assess a maximum penalty of
five thousand dollars); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-23-6-4 (Michie 1991) (authorizing from fifty
to one thousand dollars); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 357-C:15, 651:2(IV)(b) (1995 & Supp.
1996) (authorizing a corporate fine up to twenty thousand dollars); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 396-p(6) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (authorizing maximum penalties of fifty dollars for the
first offense and two hundred fifty dollars for subsequent offenses).
52. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1603.
53. See id. at 1604.
54. Id.
55. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer was joined by Justices O'Connor
and Souter. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Because the Court in Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1990), found that the procedures of imposing punitive damages
used by Alabama were not unconstitutional per se and imposed definite and meaningful
constraints upon the jury in its imposition of punitive damages, see infra notes 102, 105
and accompanying text, Justice Breyer practically had no choice but to start his analysis
with the assumption that these very same procedures, as used in BMW, were fair.
56. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1605 (Breyer, J., concurring).
57. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
58. See id at 1605-09 (Breyer, 3., concurring).
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priate for different types of conduct." Second, the Alabama courts'
application of their own Green Oil factors, which were intended to
constrain punitive damages awards, failed to effect that purpose.6
Third, the state courts in no way made use of an alternative standard
or theory, such as some economic justification for the award, that
could provide the constraining legal force otherwise absent.6' Fourth,
the punitive damages award did not conform to "any community un-
derstanding or historic practice ... which ... would provide
background standards constraining arbitrary behavior and excessive
awards." 62 Finally, no legislative enactments classifying or quantita-
tively limiting punitive damages awards constrained the otherwise
59. See id at 1605-06 (Breyer, J. concurring); see also ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1993)
(authorizing punitive damages in cases of "oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice"); id
§ 6-11-20(b) (defining fraud to include the "intentional ... concealment of a material fact
the concealing party had a duty to disclose, which was gross, oppressive, or malicious");
id § 6-11-20(b)(2) (defining malice to include any "wrongful act without just cause or
excuse ... [w]ith an intent to injure the ... property of another"); id § 6-11-20(b)(5)
(defining oppression to include "[s]ubjecting a person to ... unjust hardship in conscious
disregard of that person's rights"). Justice Breyer read these statutes to authorize puni-
tive damages for a "vast range of conduct," from the truly egregious to the "less serious,"
such as the conduct in this case. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1605-06 (Breyer, J., concurring).
60. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1606-07 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also supra note 28
(listing the Green Oil factors).
61. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1607-08 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 160-62
(1987) (noting that deliberate torts, the subject matter of most punitive damages awards,
are more likely to be concealed and accordingly require a larger punishment when de-
tected, and that punishment above actual damage may protect against accidental
underdeterrence due to court errors); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW 162 (1987) (arguing that "[i]f liability equals losses caused ... [divided
by] the probability of suit, injurers will act optimally under liability rules despite the
chance that they will escape suit"); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence:
When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1149-59 (1989) (presenting economic
models for "binary choice" and "continuous choice" behavior to effect the deterrent func-
tion of punitive damages). See generally Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1982) (outlining first a mathematical, and then
a general legal assessment of the interaction of punitive damages and economics); David
Friedman, An Economic Explanation of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1125 (1989)
(exploring the economic validity of punitive damages and concluding that they are
"consistent with the predictions of economic efficiency").
62. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1608 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer rejected as inac-
curate various inflation-adjusted estimates of large awards for similarly culpable conduct
from eighteenth and nineteenth century English cases. See id (Breyer, J., concurring).
These cases were offered by amici for Dr. Gore and attempted to provide some historical
analogue for the two million dollar award in this case. See id (Breyer, J., concurring).
Apparently, to remove any lingering doubt as to his historical accuracy, Justice Breyer
attached an entire appendix dedicated to rebutting the amici's brief by demonstrating that
the amici used incorrect measures of inflation in converting the early punitive damages
awards to present-day dollars. See id. at 1609-10 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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unbounded discretion in this case.6 Justice Breyer found this lack of
significant legal constraint on both the court and the jury's discretion,
when combined with the grossly excessive amount of the award, suf-
ficient to overcome the strong presumption of validity accorded such
decisions, thus violating "the basic guarantee of nonarbitrary gov-
ernmental behavior that the Due Process Clause provides."64
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia fundamentally disagreed
with the majority not only in its analysis of the facts but also in the
very existence of a constitutional prohibition against excessive puni-
tive damages awards.6 According to Justice Scalia, "What the
Fourteenth Amendment's procedural guarantee assures is an oppor-
tunity to contest the reasonableness of a damages judgment in state
court; but there is no federal guarantee a damages award actually be
reasonable., 6 He criticized the majority's action in overturning the
state court's award of punitive damages as lacking precedential sup-
port and pointed out that no previous case had done so. Further, he
argued that those cases on which the majority relied, TXO and
Haslip, were "shallowly rooted" in the dicta of "a handful of errant
federal cases."67
In addition, Justice Scalia sharply denounced the majority's
analysis:
One might understand the Court's eagerness to enter this
field, rather than leave it with the state legislatures, if it had
something useful to say. In fact, however, its opinion pro-
vides virtually no guidance to legislatures, and to state and
federal courts, as to what a "constitutionally proper" level
of punitive damages might be.'
He further disagreed with the Court's use of a states' interests
63. See id. at 1608-09 (Breyer, J., concurring); cf. statutes cited infra note 79
(constraining punitive damages by capping the amount, providing for some portion of the
award to go to state, or requiring bifurcation of liability and punitive damages determina-
tions).
64. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1609 (Breyer, J., concurring).
65. See id. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. See
id (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that " 'concern about punitive damages
that "run wild" '" is none of the Court's business and, consequentially, intrudes upon
states' rights. Id (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 18 (1991)). Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, expressed essen-
tially the same concern in her dissent, though in a more subdued tone. See id at 1616-17
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
66. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. Id at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text
(discussing the early twentieth century cases cited in TXO and Haslip).
68. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1612 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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analysis, emphasizing that a similar analysis had a disparaging effect
on the field of conflicts of law.69 He noted that the majority discussed
at length which acts could be punished, lawful or unlawful, in-state or
out-of-state, rather than the issue before the Court, which was how
much punishment for a particular act is excessive. 7 From Justice
Scalia's perspective, this discussion was moot because the Alabama
Supreme Court had expressly disclaimed reliance on BMW's out-of-
state actions in remitting the punitive damages award, reducing the
majority's statements regarding state sovereignty and interstate
commerce to "the purest dicta.'
Furthermore, Justice Scalia stated that the Court's three guide-
posts "mark a road to nowhere [and] provide no real guidance at
all."2 He criticized the examples of reprehensible conduct given by
the majority' and the legal standards it set forth as amounting to
nothing more than "criss-crossing platitudes."74 Moreover, he noted
that the majority did not attempt to limit the constitutional test of
excessiveness to the three guideposts, but rather expressly acknowl-
edged that the guideposts may in certain circumstances give way to
additional factors or unnamed considerations.75 Such a framework,
he concluded, does not adequately constrain or inform the state leg-
islatures and lower courts as to when a punitive damages award is
constitutionally proper.7
69. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). This "sort of 'interest analysis' ... has laid waste
the formerly comprehensible field of conflict of laws." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia observed that there was no reason
the jury could not consider BMW's out-of-state conduct, lawful or unlawful, in computing
the degree of punishment, once it determined BMW was liable for its in-state conduct.
See i& He compared this rationale to that of criminal sentences, which the Court allows
to "be computed ... on the basis of 'information concerning every aspect of a defendant's
life.'" Id (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-52
(1949)).
71. Id. at 1613 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 1613-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying note 41
(listing conduct the Court found reprehensible in previous cases).
74. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1613-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia criticized stan-
dards offered by the majority such as a "general concern of reasonableness," that the
award not be "breathtaking" nor "raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow," and that legislative
sanctions for comparable misconduct be given "substantial deference." See id (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
75. See id at 1614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. See id (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court's framework, Justice Scalia stated,
"does nothing at all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon its essentially
ad hoe determination that this particular award of punitive damages was not 'fair.'" Id
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Finally, Justice Scalia interpreted the majority's opinion to cast a
constitutional shadow over the sufficiency of all evidentiary findings
in state civil suits:
That the issue has been framed in terms of a constitutional
right against unreasonably excessive awards should not ob-
scure the fact that the logical and necessary consequence of
the Court's approach is the recognition of a constitutional
right against unreasonably imposed awards as well.... That
is a stupefying proposition.'
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting separately and joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, expressed concerns similar to those of Justice Scalia
regarding federal intrusion into an area traditionally belonging to the
states, which she pointed out was the subject of recent and ongoing
reform by the state legislatures. 8 She agreed that the Alabama Su-
preme Court's disclaimer of reliance on out-of-state conduct made
77. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In an appendix to her opinion, Justice Ginsburg
catalogued the states' judicial and legislative attempts to reform punitive damages. See
id. at 1618-20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She sorted the actions into those capping puni-
tive damages, those allocating punitive damages to state agencies, and those requiring
bifurcation of liability and punitive damages determinations. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting).
For a sampling of statutes imposing caps, see COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-21-102(1)(a),
(3) (1987) (restricting punitive damages to the amount of actual damages, with some ex-
ceptions); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-240b (1996) (capping punitive damages in products
liability actions at twice compensatory damages); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp.
1995) (capping punitive damages at $250,000 for specific tort actions and prohibiting mul-
tiple awards based on the same tortious conduct in products liability actions); OKLA,
STAT. tit. 23, §§ 9.1(B)-(D) (Supp. 1996) (capping punitive damages at the greater of
$100,000 or actual damages, if the defendant is found guilty of reckless disregard; and at a
maximum of $500,000, twice the actual damages, or the defendant's gain from the con-
duct, if the defendant is found to have acted intentionally and maliciously); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1992) (capping punitive damages at $350,000).
For a sampling of statutes allocating punitive damages to state agencies, see FLA.
STAT. ch. 768.73(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1992) (allocating 35% of punitive damages to General
Revenue Fund or Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-
5.1(e)(2) (Supp. 1996) (allocating 75% of punitive damages, after litigation costs and at-
torney's fees, to the state treasury); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992) (allocating
50% of punitive damages exceeding $20,000 to the state treasury).
For a sampling of statutes requiring mandatory bifurcation of liability and punitive
damages determinations, see CAL. CIV. CODE. § 3295(d) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring
bifurcation, on defendant's request, of liability and punitive damages phases of trials
when the plaintiff seeks punitive damages); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(a)-(b) (1994)
(providing for trier of fact determining defendant's liability for punitive damages with the
court setting the amount); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:58C-5(b), (d) (West 1987) (mandating
separate proceedings for determining compensatory and actual damages).
In addition, New Hampshire bars punitive damages unless explicitly provided by
statute. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (Supp. 1996).
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the "excessiveness of the award.., the sole issue genuinely pre-
sented"79 and went on to emphasize the lack of a sufficient legal
standard in both the majority and Justice Breyer's opinions:
The exercise is engaging, but ultimately tells us only this:
too big will be judged unfair. What is the Court's measure
of too big? Not a cap of the kind a legislature could order,
or a mathematical test this Court can divine and impose.
Too big is, in the end, the amount at which five Members of
the Court bridle.'
At their most fundamental level, the issues in BMW stem from
the Constitution's guarantee that the government will not deprive
citizens of their property without due process of law.8' The Court
first hinted that this guarantee extended to the assessment of punitive
damages in several cases from the first part of this century, and it is in
these cases that BMW finds its roots.2 In Seaboard Air Line Railway
v. Seegers," the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a South Caro-
lina law that imposed a fifty dollar penalty against a common carrier
for actual damages of less than two dollars 4 The Court rejected the
carrier's principal claim that the statute denied it equal protection
79. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1615 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg noted that
the Alabama Supreme Court complied with the United States Supreme Court in admit-
ting evidence of out-of-state actions as proper means of showing the pervasiveness of the
defendant's policy, and the Alabama court's denouncement of using the number of such
actions as a multiplier was already being followed in that state. See iL (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting).
80. Id. at 1617 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Ginsburg expressed
concern that the Supreme Court will be "the only federal court policing" state court puni-
tive damages awards, which, she stated, is "all the more puzzling in view of the Court's
long standing reluctance to countenance review, even by courts of appeals, of the size of
verdicts returned by juries in federal district court proceedings." Id (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (citing 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2820 (2d ed. 1995)).
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Even an overview of this nation's due process
jurisprudence would be beyond the scope of this Note. For a general treatment of due
process, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 11.1-
11.14 (5th ed. 1995) and LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 10-7
(2d ed. 1988).
82. But see BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Although [these cases]
are our precedents, they are themselves too shallowly rooted to justify the Court's recent
undertaking.").
83. 207 U.S. 73 (1907).
84. See id. at 75-76. The statute required that common carriers pay claims for dam-
aged or lost property within forty days; in the event the carrier failed to pay the claim, it
was penalized the fifty dollars only if a court of competent jurisdiction found the claimant
entitled to the entire claim. See id. If the claimant was entitled to any lesser amount, it
received only actual damages. See id.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment.' Noting the significant differ-
ence between the size of the penalty and the actual damages, the
Court remarked that "there are limits beyond which penalties may
not go," but found that the limit had not been reached in that case.6
Two years later in Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas ,r the Court
addressed a $1,623,500 fine assessed against Waters-Pierce in accor-
dance with Texas antitrust statutes.s Recognizing the legitimacy of
the fines under the police power of the state, the Court concluded
that it could "only interfere with such legislation and judicial action
of the States enforcing it if the fines imposed are so grossly excessive
as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of
law."'89 Thus, Seegers, Waters-Pierce, and several cases a few years
after them,'° planted the seed for the Court's striking down of the pu-
nitive damages award in BMW some eighty years later.
This seed lay dormant during most of those eighty years, until
unprecedented jury verdicts" brought defendants to the Court seek-
85. See id. at 76-77. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits any state from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
86. Seegers, 207 U.S. at 78-79.
87. 212 U.S. 86 (1909).
88. See id at 96-97. Under one statute, Waters-Pierce was fined $1500 per day for
1033 days; under another, $50 per day for 1480 days. See id. at 97.
89. Id at 111 (emphasis added) (citing Coffey v. County of Harlan, 204 U.S. 659
(1907)).
90. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919)
(stating that state law violates the Fourteenth Amendment when it imposes penalties "so
severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously un-
reasonable"); Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286-87 (1912) (stating that state
supreme courts are limited by their duty to avoid imposing excessive fines and damages).
Justice Scalia has criticized these cases as the product of Lochner-era judicial activ-
ism. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting the proposition that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides, among "other, unenumerated, substantive rights," a substantive due
process right that punitive damages be reasonable, "however fashionable that proposition
may have been (even as to economic rights of the sort involved here) at the time of the
Lochner-era cases the plurality relies upon"). But see id at 455 (Stevens, J., plurality)
(pointing out that the dissenters from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), joined in
these opinions); id at 479-80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[The plurality] reaffirms [these
cases] once again, properly rebuffing respondents' attempt to denigrate them as Lochner-
era aberrations."). As one commentator explained: "Put simply, the Lochner era has
been so thoroughly discredited as improper judicial activism that serious discussion of the
appropriate role of economic rights in our constitutional jurisprudence is virtually pre-
cluded." Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a Coherent
Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329,332 (1995).
91. See supra note 4 (citing cases involving numerous multi-million dollar jury ver-
dicts for punitive damages).
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big constitutional relief from their punitive damages awards; how-
ever, until Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,2 none were
successful in properly presenting the due process issue to the Court.93
Despite concerns over punitive damages expressed by several Jus-
tices in the earlier opinions, 4 the Haslip Court upheld an Alabama
jury's large award of punitive damages against a constitutional attack
under the Due Process Clause.95 The defendant's agent was found
liable for insurance fraud, and the jury returned a general verdict of
over one million dollars, with at least $840,000 of this amount repre-
senting punitive damages.96 After the Alabama Supreme Court
92. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
93. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76-80 (1988) (refusing to
hear Fourteenth Amendment claims because they had not been raised in the state court
below); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986) (declining to hear ap-
pellant's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment arguments because the Court's disposition
of the case on other grounds made it unnecessary to decide the constitutional claims).
Likewise, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermon4 Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257 (1989), the Court refused to address Browning-Ferris's claim of excessiveness
under the Fourteenth Amendment since it had not raised the argument in the state pro-
ceedings. See id at 276-77. More importantly, however, the Court held in Browning-
Ferris that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to punitive
damages awards in cases between private parties, foreclosing one avenue of constitutional
attack. See id. at 259-60. The Court left open the question of whether the Excessive
Fines Clause is implicated when a governmental entity shares in the award of the punitive
damages. See idt at 275 n.21.
94. In Browning-Ferris, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, expressed his
opinion on punitive damages in no uncertain terms:
I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that it leaves the door open for a
holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive dam-
ages in civil cases brought by private parties....
Without statutory (or at least common-law) standards for the determination of
how large an award of punitive damages is appropriate in a given case, juries are
left largely to themselves in making this important, and potentially devastating
decision.
Id. at 280-81 (Brennan, J., concurring). Current Members of the Court agreed:
I share Justice Brennan's view ... that nothing in the Court's opinion forecloses
a due process challenge to awards of punitive damages or the method by which
they are imposed, and I adhere to my comments in Bankers Life & Casualty Co.
v. Crenshaw, ... regarding the vagueness and procedural due process problems
presented by juries given unbridled discretion to impose punitive damages.
Id. at 283 (O'Connor, J., joined by Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("In most jurisdic-
tions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they
not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable
amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused.").
95. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24. Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens joined. See id. at 2.
96. See id at 6-7 & n.2. It appears from the record that $200,000 of the $1,040,000
verdict were most likely compensatory damages, leaving the remainder as punitive dam-
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affirmed the award, Pacific Mutual challenged it "as the product of
unbridled jury discretion and as violative of its due process rights."
The Court responded with a procedural analysis of Alabama's
method of imposing punitive damages.98 The Alabama courts em-
ployed the common-law method of assessing punitive damages, which
consists of assessing an award by a properly instructed jury followed
by judicial review at the trial and appellate levels." After an histori-
cal review of this approach,1" the Court found it not to be "so
inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitu-
tional..... Despite the historical acceptance of the common-law
procedure, however, the Court expressed "concern about punitive
damages that 'run wild' ,,0 and acknowledged limits on the proce-
dure's constitutionality:
One must concede that unlimited jury discretion-or un-
limited judicial discretion for that matter-in the fixing of
punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's
constitutional sensibilities. We need not, and indeed we
cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the consti-
tutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable
that would fit every case. We can say, however, that general
concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the
court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into the
constitutional calculus.103
With this standard in mind, the Court reviewed the Alabama
procedures specifically at issue in the case and concluded that they
provided constitutionally adequate safeguards of Pacific Mutual's
due process rights."' The Court noted that the punitive damages
ages. See id. at 7 n.2.
97. Id. at 7.
98. See id at 7-8, 15-24.
99. See i at 15. The jury should be instructed "to consider the gravity of the wrong
and the need to deter similar wrongful conduct." I&.
100. See id. at 15-18.
101. Id. at 17.
102. i at 18. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court is not alone in expressing such
concern. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 9, at 976 ("With few exceptions, [scholarly papers on
punitive damages] have ... been critical of the expansion of the punitive damages rem-
edy. Professor Jeffries's stark conclusion that 'punitive damages are out of control'
accords with the general sentiment reflected in the pages of the law reviews."); see also
supra note 5 (citing law review articles supporting the view that punitive damages are out
of control as well as those denouncing this view).
103. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 (citations omitted).
104. See id. at 19-24. First, the Court found that the trial judge adequately instructed
the jury regarding punitive damages. See id. at 19-20. Though these instructions left the
jury with significant discretion, "[a]s long as the discretion is exercised within reasonable
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award was more than four times the amount of the compensatory
damages and far exceeded the statutory fine for comparable miscon-
duct under Alabama law.' s While these "monetary comparisons"
were "close to the line" of constitutional impropriety, they were off-
set by the fact that the criminal law authorized imprisonment for this
conduct."0 6 Rejecting Pacific Mutual's due process challenge, the
Court concluded that because Pacific Mutual received all of Ala-
bama's procedural protections and the award did not lack "objective
criteria," the punitive damages award was not constitutionally exces-
sive. 0
7
Just two Terms later in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Re-
constraints, due process is satisfied." Id. at 20. Second, the Court concluded that Ala-
bama's post-trial procedures for reviewing a jury's punitive damages award were
"meaningful and adequate." See id. These procedures essentially required the trial judge
to state in the record why a jury verdict was or was not upheld on grounds of excessive-
ness, considering "the 'culpability of the defendant's conduct,' the 'desirability of
discouraging others from similar conduct,' the 'impact upon the parties,' and 'other fac-
tors, such as the impact on innocent third parties.'" Itt (quoting Hammond v. Gadsden,
493 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Ala. 1986)). Finally, the Court expressly endorsed the Alabama
Supreme Court's Green Oil factors, calling them "detailed substantive standards." See id.
at 21. The Green Oil factors are listed supra in note 28.
105. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23. Pacific Mutual was found liable for insurance fraud
because its agent collected premiums from the plaintiffs but did not remit them to the
company, thus allowing their policies to lapse. See id. at 5-6; see also ALA. CODE § 27-12-
17 (1986) (prohibiting the collection of premiums for insurance which is not then or soon
to be provided); id. § 27-12-23 (1986) (prohibiting false or fraudulent statements in con-
nection with an insurance application). The maximum fine authorized by statute was
$1000, see ALA. CODE § 27-1-12 (1986), while the award in this case was not less than
$840,000. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 7 & n.2; see also supra note 97 (discussing the compen-
satory and punitive damages in this case).
106. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23.
107. See id. at 23-24. The decision, however, was not unanimous, with Justices Scalia
and Kennedy each filing opinions concurring only in the judgment and Justice O'Connor
dissenting at length. See id. at 24-40 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 4042
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 42-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
For Justice Scalia, the long historical acceptance of the common law method of as-
sessing punitive damages was absolutely dispositive of its providing due process of law.
See id. at 24-25 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("If the government chooses to follow a historically approved procedure,
it necessarily provides due process, but if it chooses to depart from historical practice, it
does not necessarily deny due process."). Justice Kennedy generally agreed with Justice
Scalia's historical'approach, especially as applied to this case, but was not convinced that
every historical practice is insulated from a due process challenge. See id. at 40
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice O'Connor dissented in the strongest terms. She argued that Alabama's pro-
cedures, "so fraught with uncertainty that they defy rational implementation," were void
for vagueness. Id. at 43-44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Any award of punitive damages
rendered under these procedures, no matter how small the amount, is constitutionally
infirm.").
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sources Corp.,' ' Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality of a frac-
tured Court,'° upheld another sizable award of punitive damages; his
holding was based largely on the potential harm that would have
been inflicted on the plaintiff had the defendant succeeded in its
scheme."' In a common-law action for slander of title, a West Vir-
ginia jury awarded the plaintiffs nineteen thousand dollars in
compensatory damages and ten million dollars in punitive damages."
Justice Stevens accepted TXO's argument that a punitive damages
award in and of itself might be so excessive as to violate due process,
declaring that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment imposes substantive limits 'beyond which penalties may not
go.' ,,112 After rejecting the parties' proposed tests for these substan-
tive limits,"' Justice Stevens returned to the Court's language from
108. 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality opinion).
109. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stevens in his analy-
sis. See id at 445. Justice Kennedy joined only in the statement of case and the
judgment, filing a separate opinion. See id. at 465 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (reviewing Justice
Kennedy's opinion). Disagreeing with the plurality's reasoning, Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment only. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 470 (Sealia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); infra note 131 (summarizing Justice Scalia's concurrence).
Finally, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice White and joined in part by Justice Souter,
filed a dissenting opinion. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 472 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); infra
notes 125-29 and accompanying text (reviewing Justice O'Connor's dissent). Justice
O'Connor had an equal number of Justices supporting her dissenting analysis as Justice
Stevens had supporting his analysis.
110. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 460-62.
111. See id& at 446. TXO approached Alliance with an extremely generous offer of a
cash payment, royalties, and other costs in exchange for assignments of the mineral rights
in a particular property, subject to Alliance holding perfect title on the property. See id.
at 447-48. TXO subsequently attempted to artificially create a cloud on the title, and
"knowingly and intentionally brought a frivolous declaratory judgment action" on the
title to force Alliance to reduce the payments and royalties. hM at 448-49 (quoting TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources, 419 S.E.2d 870, 875 (W. Va. 1992)). Alliance success-
fully counterclaimed for slander of title, with the jury returning a ten million dollar
verdict. See ia at 450-51. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment. See id. at 452.
112. Id. at 453-54 (emphasis added) (quoting Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207
U.S. 73, 78 (1907)). The Court also relied on the early twentieth century cases discussed
supra at notes 84-91 and accompanying text. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 454. In both TXO and
BMW, the petitioners challenged the award's excessiveness itself as substantively violat-
ing due process, while in Haslip, the petitioner challenged the award's excessiveness as
indicative of a process that procedurally violated due process.
113. See id. at 455-58. The Court rejected Alliance's proposed "rational basis" test as
allowing any award, "no matter how large," that would further the legitimate state inter-
ests of punishment and deterrence as constitutionally acceptable. Id at 456. TXO
offered "objective criteria," such as the comparison of the award at issue to other awards
in the same jurisdiction, to awards for similar conduct in other jurisdictions, to legislative
penalties for comparable misconduct, and to past ratios between compensatory and puni-
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Haslip, refusing to "'draw a mathematical bright line'" while main-
taining "'that [a] general concer[n] of reasonableness.., properly
enter[s] into the constitutional calculus.' ,114
TXO argued that in light of the Court's statements in Haslip that
a 4-to-1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was "close to the
line,' '.. the 526-to-1 ratio of this award was surely "'grossly exces-
sive.' ""' In response, Justice Stevens explained that the jury was
instructed to consider the harm likely to occur from the defendant's
conduct, which in this case was estimated conservatively to be at least
one million dollars.1 Considering this figure, "the disparity between
the punitive award and the potential harm does not, in [the plural-
ity's] view, 'jar one's constitutional sensibilities.' " Moreover,
Justice Stevens did not find the ratio of punitive to actual damages
controlling and concluded:
The punitive damages award in this case is certainly large,
but in light of the amount of money potentially at stake, the
bad faith of [TXO], the fact that the scheme employed in
this case was part of a larger pattern of fraud, trickery and
deceit, and petitioner's wealth, we are not persuaded that
the award was so "grossly excessive" as to be beyond the
power of the State to allow.1 9
The concurring and dissenting opinions in TXO reveal just how
complex the punitive damages issue had become. Justice Kennedy
did not agree "with the plurality's discussion of the substantive re-
quirements" of due process in terms of whether an award was
"'grossly excessive.' ""' Rather, he felt the constitutional inquiry
should "focus[] not on the amount of money a jury awards in a par-
tive damages. See id. The Court conceded that these criteria were fair considerations,
but rejected them as insufficient to constitute a "test." See id. at 456-58; cf BMW, 116 S.
Ct. at 1598-1603 (adopting three guideposts to determine if punitive damages are consti-
tutionally acceptable: the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the ratio of actual
to punitive damages, and legislative sanctions for similar misconduct); see also supra notes
38-53 and accompanying text (discussing same).
114. TXO, 509 U.S. at 458 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18
(1991)).
115. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23; see also supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's finding the four-to-one ratio "close to the line" in Haslip).
116. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 459.
117. See id. at 459-62.
118. Id. at 462 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
119. Id. (footnote omitted). TXO also challenged the award on various procedural
grounds, which the Court did not address because they were improperly raised or merit-
less. See id. at 462-63.
120. Id. at 466 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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ticular case but on its reasons for doing so. 121 Under Justice Ken-
nedy's analysis, the Due Process Clause is violated if the "award
reflects bias, passion, or prejudice," rather than reason, "no matter
what the absolute or relative size of the award."' " Because he found
the jury properly based its award on TXO's malice, he concurred in
the judgment, though he "confess[ed] to feeling a certain degree of
disquiet in affirming [the] award."'
In dissent, Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality that the
Fourteenth Amendment limits the amount of a punitive damages
award, 4 but went further to find the Constitution violated in this
case.' She did not adopt the plurality's potential harm factor' and
accordingly found the verdict "dramatically irregular, if not shock-
ing.., by any measure."'7 Alternatively, Justice O'Connor would
have overturned the verdict entirely on the basis of undue jury preju-
dice against TXO as a large out-of-state corporate defendant.'2
Hence, with the concurring and dissenting Justices freely ex-
121. Id. at 467 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
122. Id. at 469 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
123. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
124. See id. at 480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is thus common ground that an
award may be so excessive as to violate due process." (citing id. at 455 (plurality opin-
ion))).
125. See id at 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 460-62; see also supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing
the plurality's potential harm factor). Justice O'Connor pointed out that the potential
loss to Alliance had IXO succeeded in its plan did not appear in the trial record and thus
could not have been a basis for the jury's decision, see id. at 484-89 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting), and concluded it was "an after-the-fact rationalization invented by appellate
counsel who could not otherwise explain this disproportionate award." Id. at 489
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128. See id at 493, 495 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Counsels' arguments ... converted
that grave risk of prejudice into a near certainty. Repeatedly they reminded the jury that
TXO was from another State. Repeatedly they told the jury about TXO's massive
wealth. And repeatedly they told the jury it could do anything it thought 'fair.' "). Thus,
Justice O'Connor essentially applied an analysis similar to that favored by Justice Ken-
nedy, that is, an analysis not of the amount of the award but the jury's reasons for
awarding it. See id. at 467 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment); see also supra at notes 121-24 and accompanying text (reviewing Justice Kennedy's
analysis). However, Justice O'Connor came to the opposite result.
If the sentiments expressed by the trial judge in his own book are any indication, Al-
liance's lawyers probably had little trouble in getting undue evidence of TXO's wealth
before the jury. See RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS 4 (1988) ("As
long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured in-state
plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone
else's money away, but so is my job security, because the in-state plaintiffs, their families,
and their friends will re-elect me.").
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pressing their differing viewpoints, the Court did not adopt a true
constitutional standard for substantive due process in the context of
punitive damages. However, a majority of the Justices-three joining
Justice Stevens' plurality opinion, three joining Justice O'Connor's
dissent, and Justice Kennedy concurring in part-agreed in the basic
theory that due process places substantive limits on a punitive dam-
ages award; they did not agree in its application. 9 Therefore, while
the Court upheld the punitive damages award in TXO, it did not go
so far as to foreclose the possibility that an award which was the
product of a constitutionally sound procedure could nevertheless
violate substantive due process."l
Most recently, the Court refined its Haslip procedural analysis in
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, where it struck down as unconstitu-
tional Oregon's method of assessing punitive damages without post-
trial judicial review."' The Court noted it was not "concerned with
the character of the standard that will identify unconstitutionally ex-
cessive awards," but rather "what procedures are necessary to ensure
that punitive damages are not imposed in an arbitrary manner.""3
Reviewing both historical and present procedures of imposing puni-
tive damages," the Court held judicial review to be an essential
129. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 453-54 (plurality opinion); id. at 466-67 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment); id at 480 (O'Connor, 3., dissenting); see
also supra notes 109-29 and accompanying text (reviewing the TXO decision).
130. But see TXO, 509 U.S. at 470-72 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Scalia found no such substantive due process right in the Fourteenth Amendment, see id.
at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), and would have "shut the door the plurality
[left] slightly ajar." Id. at 472 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Echoing his opin-
ion from Haslip, see supra note 108, he stated that "the Constitution gives federal courts
no business in this area, except to assure that due process (Le., traditional procedure) has
been observed." TXO, 509 U.S. at 472 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
131. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
132. See id. at 2334. Oregon's lack of judicial review was mandated by its constitution:
"[N]o fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of this state, unless
the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict." OR. CONST.
art. VII (A), § 3. Some commentators have criticized the Court for granting certiorari to
Honda, because its resolution was implicit in Haslip. See Owen, supra note 1, at 405
("Why the Supreme Court squandered its limited resources hearing the case and prepar-
ing a full opinion on a clear and narrow punitive damages judicial review issue-one that
was plainly and strongly implicit in Haslip and applicable only to a single state-is diffi-
cult to understand.").
133. Honda, 512 U.S. at 420.
134. See id. at 421-32. Oregon was the only jurisdiction in the nation, either federal or
state, that did not provide judicial review of the size of punitive damages. See id. at 426-
27.
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element of due process. 5 In deciding this purely procedural ques-
tion, the Court did not fail to comment on the more substantive issue
of excessiveness, setting the stage for its decision in BMW v. Gore:
Punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary depriva-
tion of property. Jury instructions typically leave the jury
with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the presenta-
tion of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the
potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases
against big businesses, particularly those without strong lo-
cal presences.'
Thus, the pre-BMW jurisprudence indicates that while the
Court's attitude toward punitive damages prior to BMW was appar-
ent, the law was not. Haslip announced procedural limitations on the
assessment of punitive damages under the Due Process Clause.137
Though the Court did expressly approve Alabama's procedures in
Haslip, its opinion seemed to require only two things: first, that juries
exercise their discretion within "reasonable constraints"; and sec-
ond, that the award not entirely lack "objective criteria."'39 Whether
other requirements lurked within the Due Process Clause remained
uncertain.'40 Honda served only to add judicial review to Haslip's
procedural necessities.141 TXO, in addressing the size of an award as
a substantive violation of due process, may be the most important
case in understanding the Court's decision in BMW. The plurality
expanded the scope of the Court's Haslip standard to apply to sub-
135. See id. at 432.
136. Id.
137. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991); see also supra text
accompanying note 104 (quoting the Haslip standard for procedural limitations on the
assessment of punitive damages).
138. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text
(summarizing the Court's review of Alabama's procedures).
139. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23; see also supra note 105 (summarizing the Court's re-
view of Alabama's procedures).
140. Justice Scalia was especially critical of the Court's vagueness:
[T]he Court chooses to decide only that the jury discretion in the present case
was not undue. It says that Alabama's particular procedures (at least as applied
here) are not so "unreasonable" as to "cross the line into the area of constitu-
tional impropriety." This jury-like verdict provides no guidance as to whether
any other procedures are sufficiently "reasonable," and thus perpetuates the un-
certainty that our grant of certiorari in this case was intended to resolve.
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted) (first
emphasis added).
141. See Honda, 512 U.S. at 432-33; see also supra text accompanying note 136
(reviewing the Honda Court's holding that judicial review is an essential element of due
process).
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stantive as well as procedural due process challenges," while both
the plurality and the dissenters agreed that a "grossly excessive"
award would violate the Constitution. But, as Justice Kennedy aptly
pointed out, "To ask whether a particular award of punitive damages
is grossly excessive begs the question: excessive in relation to
what?"'4 He acknowledged that the Constitution requires "standards
of rationality and fairness" to prevent arbitrary results, but suggested
that more objective criteria would be helpful in the determination.'"
It was in BMW, then, that the Court sought to reconcile these
competing viewpoints and to provide the objective criteria that Jus-
tice Kennedy felt were missing. Apparently acknowledging that such
guidance was lacking in its former opinions, the Court granted certio-
rari "[b]ecause [it] believed that a review of this case would help to
illuminate 'the character of the standard that will identify
[un]constitutionally excessive awards' of punitive damages."'45 At the
very least, the opinion sets forth a balancing test: The reviewing
judge must weigh the size of an award, as justified by the properly
limited interests of the state in punishing and deterring the conduct,
against the extent to which the defendant was afforded notice of such
an award, as measured by the three guideposts of reprehensibility,
ratio, and similar sanctions. 14' This test does illuminate the character
of the standard to identify unconstitutionally excessive awards; how-
ever, because the Court framed the test in terms of historically
accepted but subjective indicia, the test falls short of providing a
workable, progressive standard that may be readily adopted and ap-
plied by the lower courts.'47
The first part of the Court's test involves weighing the state's le-
gitimate interests of punishment and deterrence.' That these
interests are the goals of punitive damages is nothing new and hardly
a source of debate. 49 However, as Justice Scalia notes, if these inter-
142. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 459-62 (plurality opinion).
143. Ik at 466 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
144. Id. at 467 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
145. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595 (quoting Honda, 512 U.S. at 420).
146. See supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text (discussing the BMW standard for
the constitutionality of punitive damages).
147. This statement assumes that such a standard would be in some way different from
the lower courts' current tools for evaluating punitive damages, which allow large and
controversial awards such as that at issue in BMW in the first place.
148. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595-96; see also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text
(discussing the states' interests analysis).
149. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of punitive dam-
ages).
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ests are so critical in evaluating the amount of a punitive damages
award, one would expect the jury to be instructed on them.'5" Unfor-
tunately, such instruction certainly would require precise statements
or measurements of a state's interests in a particular case; otherwise,
the jury would be left to determine that which is more suitable to the
consideration of the court, if not the legislature.5 ' Regardless of
these difficulties, the Alabama Supreme Court in BMW recognized
that the jury overstepped its bounds-and thus, the legitimate inter-
ests of Alabama-in using BMW's out-of-state conduct as a
multiplier in computing punitive damages.5 2 But as Justice Ginsburg
pointed out, the jury did so not because of some existing statutory or
common-law rule, but as a result of the plaintiff's counsel's closing
argument, which explicitly requested damages for every instance of
misconduct, whether in Alabama or not. '53 Thus, the verdict's failure
to reflect Alabama's interests was compounded, first, by Gore's
counsel's own suggestions of what the jury should consider and, sec-
ond, by BMW and the court's failure to correct the situation by either
objecting or instructing the jury on the proper scope of the state's in-
terests.'54 By leaving the state's interest analysis to post-verdict
review, the Court's decision does not appear to remedy this particular
problem.
The second part of the Court's test requires notice to the defen-
dant of the magnitude of the penalty that might be levied against it."
Through its three guideposts, the Court intended to quantify this no-
tice in the specific context of punitive damages and thereby provide
lower courts guidance as to when an award is unconstitutionally ex-
150. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1612 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Cf. i. at 1609 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[Hiere Alabama expects jurors to act, at
least a little, like legislators or judges, for it permits them, to a certain extent, to create
public policy and to apply that policy ... to achieve a policy-related objective outside the
confines of the particular case.").
152. See BIvW v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 627 (Ala. 1994); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 31 (discussing the Alabama Supreme Court's decision).
153. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1615 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg ob-
served:
The sole prompt to the jury to use nationwide sales as a multiplier came from
Gore's lawyer during summation. Notably, counsel for BMW failed to object to
Gore's multiplication suggestion ... [n]or did BMW's counsel request a charge
instructing the jury not to consider out-of-state sales in calculating the punitive
damages award.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
154. See id
155. See id. at 1598-99.
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cessive."6 However, the success with which the Court's intentions will
be realized is questionable for several reasons. Because the Court
largely justified its guideposts on the basis of their historical accep-
tance and continued use, the guideposts necessarily reflect current
practice instead of shaping it." In addition, the subjectivity with
which the Court applied the guideposts, coupled with its acknowl-
edgment that there may be other relevant considerations in the
analysis, prevent the opinion from providing a standard sufficiently
definite to add objectivity and predictability to punitive damages
awards."8
The Court's first guidepost, the reprehensibility of the defen-
dant's conduct, is the primary basis for imposing punitive damages."'
Because the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct has always
been a basis for awarding punitive damages,1o this guidepost tells
lower courts nothing new and provides them little guidance toward
the appropriate constitutional standard. While the examples of rep-
rehensible behavior offered by the Court may be of some help in
identifying offensive conduct,16' the determination of the degree of
156. See id. at 1595, 1598.
157. See id. at 1599,1601.
158. In Haslip, the plaintiff's attorneys posed an interesting, albeit questionable, ar-
gument against predictability in punitive damages awards. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). They contended that with
predictability in the amount of punitive damages, wrongdoers would simply factor the
probability and costs of such awards into the cost of doing business, thereby undermining
the state's interest in deterring wrongful conduct. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(rejecting this argument as "go[ing] too far" and responding that reforms necessary to
remove the arbitrary nature of punitive damages will not "straitjacketo [the jury] into
performing a particular calculus").
159. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1599; see also Owen, supra note 1, at 387 ("The flagrancy
of the misconduct is thought to be the primary consideration in determining the amount
of punitive damages.").
160. See BMW, .116 S. Ct. at 1599 ("As the Court stated nearly 150 years ago, exem-
plary damages imposed on a defendant should reflect 'the enormity of his offense.'"
(quoting Day v. Woodworth, 55 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1852))); see also id. at 1599 n.24
("The principle that punishment should fit the crime 'is deeply rooted and frequently
repeated in common-law jurisprudence.'" (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284
(1983))).
161. The Court's examples of particularly reprehensible conduct included violence,
trickery and deceit, and malice. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1599-1601; see also supra text
accompanying note 41 (discussing same). While these examples are quite obvious and
would seem to provide little guidance for that reason, it was precisely the presence of
malice that swayed Justice Kennedy to concur in the judgment upholding the punitive
damages award in TXO. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
468 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("On its
facts, this case is close and difficult.... There is ... [an] explanation for the jury verdict,
one supported by the record and relied upon by the state courts, that persuades me that I
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reprehensibility in a given case remains an inherently subjective in-
quiry, as the Court's fact-specific opinion confirms.'62 Moreover, the
majority's endorsement of this guidepost raises a concern as to the
extent to which a court's determination of reprehensibility displaces
the jury as the finder of fact. Unfortunately, the BMW majority
failed to address this concern. '63
The Court's second guidepost, the ratio of the punitive damages
to actual or potential harm, grows out of the traditional requirement
that punitive damages "must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to com-
pensatory damages."1 " As the Court points out, this factor is nothing
new and has long been used by lower courts.' 6 As a simple mathe-
matical formula, this factor is potentially the most objective of the
three guideposts. However, the Court refused to adopt a bright line
test and therefore failed to take advantage of this objectivity.'"
Rather, the Court recalled TXO and its potential loss factor'67 and
"suggested that the relevant ratio was not more than 10 to 1," only to
cannot say with sufficient confidence that the award was unjustified or improper on this
record: TXO acted with malice.").
162. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1599-1601 (analyzing the reprehensibility of BMW's con-
duct in this case); id. at 1609 (Breyer, J., concurring) (acknowledging that the decision
"reflects a judgment about a matter of degree"); id. at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the decision for "reflect[ing] not merely... 'a judgment about a matter of
degree'; but a judgment about the appropriate degree of indignation or outrage, which is
hardly an analytical determination" (citation omitted)).
163. Justice Scalia was critical of this omission:
The Court distinguishes today's result from Haslip and TXO partly on the
ground that "the record in this case discloses no deliberate false statements, acts
of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of improper motive, such
as were present in Haslip and TXO." This seemingly rejects the findings neces-
sarily made by the jury-that [BMW] had committed a fraud that was "gross,
oppressive, or malicious." Perhaps that rejection is intentional; the Court does
not say.
BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1614 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting i at 1601) (internal citation
omitted).
164. IcL at 1601.
165. See id. at 1601 & n.32 (citing nineteenth century cases endorsing the principal that
punitive damages should be proportionate to the actual damages sustained). But see Ellis,
supra note 1, at 58 ("[F]rom the standpoint of fairness, the adverse effects of [the
'reasonable relationship'] approach outweigh its advantages. The actual harm that oc-
curred is at best a crude measure of the moral egregiousness of a defendant's conduct
and, hence, of the punishment deserved.").
166. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602; see also supra text accompanying notes 50, 104
(discussing the Court's refusal to adopt bright line test).
167. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460-62 (1993);
supra text accompanying notes 118-19 (discussing same). While the potential harm factor
was endorsed by only a plurality in TXO and sharply criticized by Justice O'Connor in her
dissent, see TXO, 509 U.S. at 485-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), BMW's majority opinion
officially makes this factor a legitimate consideration. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602.
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retreat from this position by reciting instances in which such a ratio
would be inappropriate." The subjectivity of this inquiry is height-
ened and other complex problems are introduced when one considers
the difficult question of whose harm on which to base the ratio. This
question is closely related to the states' interest analysis,'69 and there
is no simple answer; while the extent to which a state may consider
acts outside its borders is not clear,70 the harm to persons in the state
other than the plaintiff apparently is an entirely appropriate consid-
eration.Y If this is the case, one must wonder whether an award of
punitive damages based on harm to all others in the state precludes
those other individuals from collecting punitive damages as well."
Unfortunately, the Court again does not address this concern.
Unlike the other guideposts, the third guidepost, which com-
pares the punitive damages award with civil or criminal sanctions for
168. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602. The instances in which a ratio would not apply in-
clude where especially egregious conduct results in a small amount of pecuniary harm,
where the injury is difficult to detect, or where the "monetary value of a noneconomic
harm" defies quantification. Id.
169. See id. at 1595-98; see also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing
states' interest analysis).
170. Compare BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1597 ("Alabama does not have the power ... to
punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred .... ."), with id. at 1599 (citing
favorably language from TXO stating that it is settled law that evidence of a defendant's
conduct in other parts of the country may be properly considered in assessing punitive
damages).
171. See id. at 1598 (requiring the award to be analyzed according to the interests of
Alabama consumers); id. at 1606 (Breyer, J., concurring) (finding the relevant economic
harm to include all harm inflicted in Alabama).
172. The issue of multiple punitive damages assessments has attracted much attention
in the past several years in products liability litigation. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 1, at
406 ("Surely the most momentous question as yet unresolved by the [Supreme] Court is
whether the Constitution imposes any restraints on the repetitive imposition of punitive
damages in mass disaster litigation, such as the litigation that has confronted the asbestos
industry for many years."). See generally Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1379, 1385-86 (3d
Cir.) (collecting federal and state cases and concluding the assessment of multiple puni-
tive damages against a single defendant does not violate due process), modified in part, 13
F.3d 58 (3d Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. Dunn, 510
U.S. 1031 (1993); David H. Bernstein, Punitive Damages in Mass Products Liability, 1
PROD. LIAB. L.J. 327 (1990); Jerry J. Phillips, Multiple Punitive Damage Awards, 39 VILL.
L. REV. 433 (1994) (discussing punitive damages "based on the premise that there is no
inherent due process problem arising out of multiple punitive damage awards for the
same course of conduct"); Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation:
Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 37
(1983) (discussing proposals for changing the methods of awarding punitive damages in
mass tort litigation); Barbara J. Shander, Note, Punitive Damages-Addressing the Con-
stitutionality of Punitive Damages in the Third Circuit, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1105 (1994)
(examining the constitutional arguments against multiple punitive damages and the Third
Circuit's position in Dunn).
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similar misconduct, was not adopted by the Court on the basis of its
historical acceptance and use.' 3 Accordingly, this guidepost adds a
new tool to the toolchests of lower courts. Unfortunately, the Court
fails to give much instruction in how to use it, noting only that in
BMW the punitive damages award was "substantially greater than
the statutory fines available"174 and that "a reviewing court ... should
'accord "substantial deference" to legislative judgments concerning
appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.""" Had the Court
suggested an appropriate punitive damages award in this case, the
relation between the award and the legislative sanctions would be
quite clear, providing significant guidance to lower courts. In addi-
tion, it appears from Haslip that the possibility of imprisonment for
the defendant's conduct will justify a significant award,176 though no
dollar amount is affixed to jail time. Undoubtedly, the Court will be
asked in some future case to clarify the weight accorded statutory
penalties and imprisonment.
Apart from the practical implications of the Court's decision,
BMW will likely have an impact on the theoretical distinction be-
tween substantive and procedural due process in the context of
punitive damages. The Court expressly engaged in procedural in-
quiries in both Haslip" and Honda,78 and while both procedural and
substantive challenges were issued in TXO, the members of the
Court were careful to distinguish between the two in their opinions. "
173. Indeed, its adoption is quite interesting. In BMW, the Court cited several rela-
tively recent opinions where its Members remarked on the ratio between a punitive
damages award and the applicable statutory fines. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1603; see also
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 263 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(commenting that the punitive award was one hundred times the maximum fine author-
ized by federal (civil) standards); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277
(1964) (observing the punitive damages award for libel was one thousand times greater
than the maximum fine authorized by an Alabama criminal statute). However, in TXO,
the most recent case on point, both the plurality and the dissenting Justices rejected just
such a comparison. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 456-
58 (1993) (plurality opinion); id. at 480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
174. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1603.
175. Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Ind. of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257,301 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
176. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1990); see also supra text
accompanying note 107 (discussing same).
177. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15-24.
178. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,420-35 (1994).
179. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-62, 462-66
(1993) (plurality opinion) (engaging in a substantive due process determination in Parts II
and III of the plurality opinion and dismissing TXO's procedural due process arguments
in Part IV of the opinion); id. at 479-95, 495-500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing for
reversal of the punitive damages award on a substantive due process basis in Part II of her
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However, in BMW the distinction is not so clear. From a preceden-
tial viewpoint, BMW must be a substantive inquiry, or the Court's
decision would implicitly overrule its unequivocal endorsement of
Alabama's procedures in Haslip.'" Notwithstanding the necessarily
substantive nature of the inquiry, the Court framed its analysis in
terms of notice to the defendant,1 81 a concept traditionally associated
with procedural due process.' Having declared notice as the grava-
men of its test, the Court sets forth three substantive guideposts to
determine if such notice has been effected.1 3 Justice Breyer rein-
forced this fusion of procedural and substantive due process in his
concurring opinion,8 in which he found the award invalid on both
procedural and substantive grounds: "[T]he award in this case was
both (a) the product of a system of standards that did not significantly
constrain a court's, and hence a jury's, discretion in making that
award; and (b) was grossly excessive in light of the State's legitimate
punitive damages objectives. '"'s With Justice Breyer explicitly stating
what the majority left implicit, the fusion was complete.
Despite these shortcomings, the Court's decision to strike down
a state court award of punitive damages is unquestionably significant.
Though it left the assessment of punitive damages subject to the same
processes that produced the BMW award in the first place, the Court
now has placed a constitutional requirement on lower courts to actu-
ally exercise these processes properly. No longer will mere lip service
to the rule of law be tolerated;" courts must engage in a serious post-
opinion and for reversal on an independent procedural due process basis in Part III of her
opinion).
180. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19-23 ("The application of [Alabama's process for assess-
ing punitive damages] ... imposes a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the
discretion of Alabama factfinders in awarding punitive damages.... These standards
have real effect when applied by the Alabama Supreme Court to jury awards." (emphasis
added)); see also supra notes 102, 105 and accompanying text (discussing same).
181. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1598 ("Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the con-
duct that will subject him to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty that a State
may impose."); see also supra text accompanying notes 38-39 (discussing the same lan-
guage).
182. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) ("For more than a century the
central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must be
notified.'" (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223,233 (1863))).
183. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1598.
184. See id. at 1604-10 (Breyer, J., concurring).
185. I at 1609 (Breyer, J., concurring). The first reason, a system of standards, rings
of procedure, while the second, the award being grossly excessive, rings of substance.
186. Justice O'Connor, fearing such lip service had taken place in the lower courts in
TXO, quoted unsettling language from the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals:
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verdict review of a questionable award lest they be overturned on
appeal.
However, because the BMW standard is in many ways subjective
and requires an ad hoc determination of constitutionality, the appli-
cation of the standard will consume tremendous judicial resources at
both the trial and appellate levels.1" Such expenditures risk over-
shadowing the standard itself, its effectiveness diluted in the wells of
ink spilled in its application. Justice Ginsburg's conclusion that
"[tlhe Court is not well equipped for this mission""m rings true, espe-
cially, as she points out, in light of recent state judicial and legislative
activity in this area."9 While not all agree that such "tort reform" is
necessary,"9 BMW fails to provide the guidance lower courts need.
So whether the solution to the punitive damages issue lies in a future
Supreme Court case or in the state legislatures, one thing seems cer-
"We understand as well as the next court how to ... articulate the correct legal
principle, and then perversely fit into that principle a set of facts to which the
principle obviously does not apply. [All judges] know how to mouth the correct
legal rules with ironic solemnity while avoiding those rules' logical conse-
quences."
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 907 (W. Va. 1991)
(footnote omitted)).
187. Yet even this tremendous dedication of resources pales in comparison to that
which will be required if Justice Scalia's ominous prediction-a constitutional guarantee
of the reasonableness of the imposition of punitive damages as well as all other court
findings-comes true. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. 1d. at 1617 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
189. See id at 1617-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Brian Timothy Beasley,
Note, North Carolina's New Punitive Damages Statute: Who's Being Punished Anyway?,
74 N.C. L. REv. 2174, 2202-13 app. A (1996) (categorizing punitive damages reform in
each state); supra note 79 (citing state statutes reforming the assessment of punitive dam-
ages).
190. See e.g., Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 63 ("The [empirical] findings pre-
sented in this Article provide a good reason to be skeptical of the veracity of the
reformers' characterization [of the civil justice system]."); Rustad, supra note 5, at 87
("There is certainly no crisis justifying immediate revamping of the [punitive damages]
remedy.").
According to those skeptical of tort reform, the vast majority of juries either do not
award punitive damages or award them properly. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at
31 (presenting tabular data representing 25,627 cases from 1981-85, and concluding that
"in general, juries do not award punitive damages in a large percentage of money dam-
ages cases"); Rustad, supra note 5, at 37 ("Punitive damages awards are a teaspoon-sized
drop in an ocean of civil litigation."); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 1, at 1307 (examining
empirical data and concluding "judges and juries award punitive damages with striking
rarity to individuals in suits against manufacturers"). It would seem, then, that legislative
action restricting punitive damages would affect assessments in only the rare, outrageous
cases, thereby grounding those cases hovering on the line of constitutional impropriety
and foreclosing the constitutional basis for those seeking to abolish punitive damages,
while appeasing those advocating their legitimate functions.
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tain: The centuries-old debate over punitive damages will rage on.
PAUL M. SYKES

